The Difference Between Filing Lawsuits and Selling Widgets (Appropriate Attorney Regulation)
4 PIERCE L. REV. 45 (2005)
This article explores why not all attorneys function in a free market, and consequently their remuneration should not always remain unregulated. Attorneys who file lawsuits can, by simply filing a complaint at their unfettered discretion, immediately subject defendants to the threat of a default judgment and necessitate their spending money and resources toward their defense. That dynamic results in a situation in which a defendant will be made to pay any amount to the plaintiff in settlement, provided the settlement demanded is less than the defendant's costs of defense and the plaintiff's attorneys' costs for filing the case are minimal. This article proceeds to discuss a short history of attorney regulation and concludes with a discussion of whether private attorneys who file lawsuits should be considered state actors in circumstances in which they trigger the authority of the state and, through the state, the threat of a default judgment and the consequent necessary expenditure of defense costs.
